Contingentism versus Necessitism: the Tractatus Standpoint
Abstract
The paper provides an interpretation of section 2.013 of the Tractatus which casts light on the strategic role that that section plays in the early Wittgenstein’s version of the ontology of logical atomism. The far-reaching consequences that the proposed interpretation has on the issue of the metaphysical nature of objects are spelled out, and the identification of Tractatus objects with phenomenal qualities, that is with phenomenal abstract universals, is shown to be fully consistent with those consequences. As a by-product of the analysis, the standpoint of the Tractatus with respect to both contingentism and necessitism is clarified.
References
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