Preface. Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom

  • Kurt Wischin Universidad de Granada, Spain

Abstract

Wittgenstein came to change forever how philosophy is done, at least in the eyes of a vast majority of philosophers inspired by his teachings. He did away with the last vestiges of innocent speculation about metaphysics, ontology and epistemology they say, once philosophers had learned to see language as the objective background for private thought, a lesson that cannot be forgotten. As P. M. S. Hacker puts it, philosophers before Wittgenstein were spinners of wonderful webs of philosophical illusion, while Wittgenstein was the paradigmatic destroyer of these. From this point of view, it is therefore a legitimate question about the work of any philosopher offering explanations after Wittgenstein if he is providing new insights rather than spinning new illusions. All the more, if the thinker claims that his explanations are built on crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s work: how does the new approach stand up to the many challenges the use of philosophical language faces and simultaneously beware of becoming bewitched by it?

Author Biography

Kurt Wischin, Universidad de Granada, Spain

Kurt Wischin is currently CPhil at the University of Granada, Spain. He got in touch with philosophy first at the University of Vienna in the 1970s, obtained a BA in Philosophy from the University of Queretaro, Mexico and an MPhil at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico. His main interest centres in Philosophy of Language and early Analytical Philosophy, in particular, Frege and Wittgenstein. He has published articles and translations in some anthologies and academic reviews.

References

Prefacio sin referencias
Published
2019-06-30
How to Cite
[1]
Wischin, K. 2019. Preface. Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom. Disputatio. 8, 9 (Jun. 2019), 1-11. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3551630.

Most read articles by the same author(s)

1 2 > >>