Aspects of Gottlob Frege’s Philosophy of Language in the Light of a Neo-Kantian Motivation

Abstract

Gottlob Frege was quite possibly the first analytical philosopher. For several decades the study of his teachings restricted itself almost naturally to the sphere of analytical and English speaking philosophy. The very method which Frege might have impressed upon analytical philosophy takes off with abstract and formal analysis and the apprehension of his doctrine developed under the assumption –taken to be almost self-evident- that this method is the only one capable of correctly accounting for the most fundamental philosophical problems, especially bringing forth a comprehensive theory of meaning. Hence it was taken for granted with certain automatism that the Frege´s philosophical worries were initially identical in its origins with those of contemporary analytical philosophy and those not amenable to easy adoptions are discharged as absurd anachronisms when viewed against current doctrines. Approaching Fregean thought exclusively under the assumptions of analytical philosophy, while having merit, does not take into account the anti-naturalist and neo-Kantian background which influenced the modelling of Frege’s fundamental convictions. Some contentious aspects like for example the context principle, a possible hierarchy of indirect senses or the almost tacit assumption that Frege’s doctrine is a theory about referential expressions appear in a different light, once we become aware that his attempt at system-construction, as far as it concerns philosophy, is fundamentally an answer to problems which Frege found in Kant’s system.