Why Is Sellars’s Essay Called “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”?
Abstract
‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (EPM) is sometimes read as attacking empiricism in general. But Sellars’s announced target is traditional empiricism. In traditional empiricism, experience yields knowledge in a way that does not presuppose other empirical knowledge, so that the knowledge provided by experience can serve as foundations, in a straightforward sense, for other empirical knowledge. To accept this conception is to fall into a form of the Myth of the Given. In EPM Sellars works out a different conception of experience, according to which it is a kind of inner episode that, in the best kind of case, yields knowledge, but in a way that presupposes other empirical knowledge. The knowledge provided by experience can still serve as foundations for other empirical knowledge, but now only in a nuanced sense. The article concludes that so far from rejecting empiricism altogether, EPM rehabilitates empiricism, but in a non-traditional form.
Downloads
References
Brandom, Robert B. (2000). “Insights and Blind Spots of Reliabilism”. In Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, Robert B. (2002). “The Centrality of Sellars’s Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’”. In Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri and George Nakhnikian, eds. (1963). Morality and the Language of Conduct. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid (1967). Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reissued Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1992.
Sellars, Wilfrid (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with an introduction by Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Copyright (c) 2019 © Analysis
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.