Metafísica como ciencia de la esencia
Palabras clave:
Mundos posibles, Categorías ontológicas, Ser, Existencia, Identidad
Resumen
Si la metafísica se ocupa fundamentalmente de trazar el dominio de lo posible, la única explicación coherente del fundamento de la posibilidad metafísica y de nuestra capacidad para el conocimiento modal se encuentra en una versión del esencialismo: una versión que llamo esencialismo serio, para distinguir de algunas otras opiniones que superficialmente pueden parecer muy similares a él, pero que, de hecho, difieren de él fundamentalmente en ciertos aspectos cruciales. Esta versión del esencialismo evita cualquier apelación a la noción de mundos posibles en su explicación de la naturaleza y el fundamento de la posibilidad metafísica, por razones que trataré de explicar y justificar en este artículo.
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Referencias
Descartes, René (1986). Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. J. Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, Michael (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.
Fine, Kit (1994). ‘Essence and Modality’. In Philosophical Perspectives, 8: Logic and Language, ed. James E. Tomberlin. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kripke, Saul A. (1991). ‘Identity and Necessity’. In Identity and Individuation, ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press.
Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David K. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell.
Locke, John (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowe, J. E. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2002). ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson’. The Philosophical Quarterly 52: pp. 369–72.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Identity, Vagueness, and Modality’. In Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, ed. J. L. Bermúdez. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Ontological Dependence’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence’,.Ratio 16: pp. 140–60.
Lowe, J. E. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2014). ‘Recent Advances in Metaphysics: Ontological Categories and Categorial Schemes’. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 3, nº 4: pp. 89–111.
Merrihew Adams, Robert (1974). ‘Theories of Actuality’. Noûs 8: pp. 211–31.
Olson, Eric T. (2001). ‘Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem’. The Philosophical Quarterly 51: pp. 337–55.
Plantinga, Alvin (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’. In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1983). ‘Why There Isn’t a Ready–Made World’. In Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume 3 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1969). ‘Existence and Quantification’. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosen, Gideon (1990). ‘Modal Fictionalism’. Mind 99: pp. 327–54.
Wiggins, David (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, Michael (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.
Fine, Kit (1994). ‘Essence and Modality’. In Philosophical Perspectives, 8: Logic and Language, ed. James E. Tomberlin. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kripke, Saul A. (1991). ‘Identity and Necessity’. In Identity and Individuation, ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press.
Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David K. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell.
Locke, John (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowe, J. E. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2002). ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson’. The Philosophical Quarterly 52: pp. 369–72.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Identity, Vagueness, and Modality’. In Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, ed. J. L. Bermúdez. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Ontological Dependence’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/.
Lowe, J. E. (2005). ‘Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence’,.Ratio 16: pp. 140–60.
Lowe, J. E. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, J. E. (2014). ‘Recent Advances in Metaphysics: Ontological Categories and Categorial Schemes’. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 3, nº 4: pp. 89–111.
Merrihew Adams, Robert (1974). ‘Theories of Actuality’. Noûs 8: pp. 211–31.
Olson, Eric T. (2001). ‘Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem’. The Philosophical Quarterly 51: pp. 337–55.
Plantinga, Alvin (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’. In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1983). ‘Why There Isn’t a Ready–Made World’. In Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume 3 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1969). ‘Existence and Quantification’. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosen, Gideon (1990). ‘Modal Fictionalism’. Mind 99: pp. 327–54.
Wiggins, David (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Publicado
2016-12-19
Cómo citar
[1]
Lowe, E.J. 2016. Metafísica como ciencia de la esencia. Analysis. Claves de Pensamiento Contemporáneo. 19, (dic. 2016), no. 7: pp. 1-30. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1297187.
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Sección
Humanidades
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