Sobre la imaginación en Hume

  • Fabian Dorsch University of Fribourg, Suiza
Palabras clave: Ficción, Creencia, Percepción, Memoria, Epistemología modal, Empiricismo, Disyuntivismo

Resumen

Este artículo revisa el pensamiento de Hume sobre la naturaleza y el papel del imaginar, poniendo el foco de atención casi exclusivamente en el primer libro de su Tratado de la naturaleza humana. A lo largo de este texto, Hume establece y discute tres distinciones importantes en nuestros episodios mentales conscientes (o lo que él llama «percepciones»): (i) entre impresiones (incluyendo experiencias perceptuales) e ideas (incluyendo recuerdos, imaginaciones y creencias ocurrentes); (ii) entre ideas de la memoria e ideas de la imaginación; y (iii) en cuanto las ideas de la imaginación, entre ideas del juicio (i.e. creencias ocurrentes) e ideas de la fantasía (i.e. imaginaciones). Yo discuto una a una cada una de estas ideas, también con relación a los puntos de vista contemporáneas sobre el imaginar. Toco además brevemente los puntos de vista de Hume sobre la imaginación como facultad dirigida a la generación de ideas, y sobre el papel que el imaginar tiene en un contexto más amplio de nuestras vidas mentales, notablemente en la obtención de conocimiento modal y en la comprensión de historias y opiniones que entendemos como falsas o ficticias.

Biografía del autor/a

Fabian Dorsch, University of Fribourg, Suiza

Fabian Dorsch es Profesor-Investigador SNF de la University of Fribourg, Suiza. Doctor en Filosofía por el University College London. Sus mayores intereses son la filosofía de la mente, la epistemología, la meta-ética, la metafísica y la estética. Es co–editor, junto con Fiona Macpherson, de los libros: Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford/NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2018) y Phenomenal Presence (Oxford/NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2018); es autor de Die Natur der Farben (Berlín: De
Gruyter, 2009) y de The Unity of Imagining (Berlín: De Gruyter, 2012).

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Publicado
2018-12-31
Cómo citar
[1]
Dorsch, F. 2018. Sobre la imaginación en Hume. Disputatio. 7, 8 (dic. 2018), a008. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2551858.
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