The advantages of an externalist solution in response to the skeptical challenge
Abstract
The skeptical challenge is a test that any theory of justification must be able to overcome; for, if a given epistemic theory does not pass this test and therefore we cannot be justified in most of our beliefs, then there is something wrong with that theory. Thus, the skeptical challenge has a methodological function. We want to argue that externalist theories of justification deal with the skeptical challenge better than internalist theories of justification. To do this, we will start by characterizing what internism and externism are in general with respect to epistemic justification.
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