Callous murderers and the abuse excuse
Resumen
In this essay, I hold the assumption that most people would be horrified by callous murders. Having that in mind, I briefly explain two things: first, the Strawsonian view of reactive attitudes which says that feelings of blame and outrage, for example, tell us a lot about the moral responsibility of the perpetrator of the action that gives rise to those attitudes; second, the abuse excuse which says that evildoers may be excused from their actions if they were abused in their upbringing. Then, I panoramically argue that our initial reactive attitudes of blame and horror towards callous murderers should not be changed if we get to know about their history of abuse. This will mean —following a Strawsonian view— that callous murderers should remain equally responsible, culpable, and blameworthy for their actions.
Referencias
STRAWSON, Peter (1994). «Freedom and Resentment». En: Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, editado por John Martin Fischer y Mark Ravizza. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 45 — 66. doi.org/10.7591/9781501721564—002.
WATSON, Gary (1988). «Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme». En: Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays on Moral Psychology, editado por F. Shoeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 256 — 286. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625411.011.
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