Frege and the Controversy about Psychologism
Abstract
Ever since Frege's time and until approximately the seventies of the 20th Century, both the formal presentation of logic and the philosophical conception about the nature of the laws of logic were dominated by Frege's ideas y his position that mathematics and logic are not psychological disciplines: while psychological laws verse about facts of psychology, the laws of logic verse about «thoughts». We believe that Frege's distinction between the laws of logic and the laws of psychology leave room for exploration about the possible relation between logic and psychology. In this paper, we shall try to at least draft an argumentation capable of supporting this view.
References
Frege, Gottlob (1884). Die Grundlagen der Aritmetk: eine logisch–mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl. [Existe traducción al ingles: The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico–Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number. Trad. J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980].
Frege, G. (1893–1903) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet. [Existe traducción al ingles: Basic Laws of Arithmetic: An Exposition of the System. Trad. M. Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964].
Haack, Susan (1979). Philosophy of Logics. Londres–Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Kusch, Martín (1995). Psychologism. A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Londres–Nueva York: Routledge.
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