El estatus convencional de las idealizaciones en teorías físicas

José Luis Rolleri

José Luis Rolleri Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Mexico

Keywords: Poincaré, Physical Law, Unrealistic Supposition, Counterfactual Condition

Abstract

The objective of this paper consists in to propose and try to support the thesis that the idealizations in the field of physics have a conventional status. In order to get that, I pursue, to some extend, Poincaré´s reasoning about the conventional status of the diverse geometries, euclidean and no-euclidean, to give an argumentation in favor of that the idealized suppositions on which rest both laws formulation and model construction have neither a necessary character nor an empirical basis: instead, they are conventions. That is, the unrealistic, counterfactual, suppositions in physics are adopted since they are convenient in order to obtain a conceptualization in certain mode of systems and processes, relatively to the physical theory in question. This proposal finds support in the thesis that there are idealizations which are neither removed by realistic suppositions nor reducible to experience.

Author Biography

José Luis Rolleri, Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Mexico

José Luis Rolleri es profesor de Filosofía de la ciencia en la Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, México. Doctor [≈PhD] en Filosofía por la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México. Ha sido catedrático en varias universidades, como son: Universidad Michoacana, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana y Universidad de Guadalajara. Su campo de trabajo e investigación es la filosofía de la ciencia. Ha publicado numerosos artículos en revista como Crítica, Diánoia, Mathesis, Signos filosóficos, Analogía filosófica, Ideas y valores, Praxis filosófica, Theoria, Teorema y Ágora. Es autor de los libros: Probabilidad, causalidad y explicación (Querétaro: Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, 2009); Introducción a la Filosofía actual de la ciencia (México: Fontamara, 2012) y Modelos, idealizaciones y conceptualismo (México: Colofón / Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, 2016).

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The Conventional Status of Idealizations in Physical Theories

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Author Biography

References

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