Elucidation and Ostension in the Tractatus
Abstract
Wittgenstein writes at §3.263 of the Tractatus that “[t]he meanings of primitive signs can be explained by elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. They can therefore only be understood if the meanings of these signs are already known”. Hacker has argued that such elucidation should be understood in terms of ostension. But Hacker’s reading, I argue, renders mysterious Wittgenstein’s claim at §3.02 that “what is thinkable is also possible.” In the second part of the paper, I try to show that the problem incurred by Hacker’s understanding of §3.263 is strongly reminiscent of a problem Wittgenstein first raised for Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement in 1913 (recapitulated at Tractatus §5.5422). It is therefore unlikely that Wittgenstein should have thought of the elucidation of Tractarian names in the ostension-based way Hacker suggests.
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