Powers as Causal Truthmakers
Palabras clave:
Disposición, Causación, Necesidad, Prevención, Determinismo, Probabilidad, Clasificación, Ausencias, Modalidad, Hume
Resumen
La mayoría de las teorías de causación asumen que debe envolverse algún tipo de necesidad, o que la causa debe ser enteramente suficiente para el efecto. Otros ya han sugerido que debería de ser posible obtener una teoría de causación a partir de una teoría de poderes o disposiciones. Un proyecto tal está muy lejos de estar completo, pero incluso aquí encontramos que ha faltado el punto clave en una teoría dispositiva de causación. Este escrito intenta establecer algunos de los principios más importantes de una teoría tal, y al hacerlo inclina la discusión existente en una nueva dirección.
Referencias
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1971). «Causality and determination». In: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981: 133-47
Bhaskar, R. (1975). A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books Limited.
Burks, A. W. (1951). «The Logic of Causal Propositions». Mind, 60: 363-82.
Burks, A. W. (1955). «Dispositional Statements». Philosophy of Science, 22: 175-93.
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dowe, P. (2001). «A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and “Causation” by Omission». Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 216-26.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift. In: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds), Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble: 1-20.
Harré, R. and Madden, E. H. (1975). Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.
Hume, D. (1740). «Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature». In: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P. Millican (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 133-45.
Hume, (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. P. Millican (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. N. Kemp Smith trans. London: MacMillan, 1929.
Lewis, D. (1973). «Causation». In: Philosophical Papers II, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 159-213.
Lewis, D. (2004). «Void and Object». In: Collins, Hall and Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004: 277-90.
Lipton, P. (1999). «All Else Being Equal». Philosophy, 74: 155-68.
Martin, C. B. (1994). «Dispositions and Conditionals». The Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 1-8.
Martin, C. B. (2008). The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, D. H. (1971). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, D. H. (1988). «On Raising the Chances of Effects». In: Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 225-34.
Mellor, D. H. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic. London: Parker.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. S. Mumford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in Nature. Abingdon: Routledge.
Mumford, S. (2009). «Passing Powers Around». The Monist, 92: 94-111.
Newton, I (1687). Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. A. Motte trans. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1792, revised by F. Cajori,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schaffer, J. (2004). «Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to Their Effects: the Case for negative Causation«. In: Hitchcock (ed.) Contemporary Debates in
Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Blackwell: 197-216.
Schrenk, M. (2008). «Hic Rhodos, hic Salta. From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions». In: G. Damschen, R. Schnepf, K. Stueber (eds.) Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Sosa, E. (1980). «Varieties of Causation». In: E. Sosa and M. Tooley (eds), Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 234-42.
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1971). «Causality and determination». In: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981: 133-47
Bhaskar, R. (1975). A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books Limited.
Burks, A. W. (1951). «The Logic of Causal Propositions». Mind, 60: 363-82.
Burks, A. W. (1955). «Dispositional Statements». Philosophy of Science, 22: 175-93.
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dowe, P. (2001). «A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and “Causation” by Omission». Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 216-26.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift. In: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds), Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble: 1-20.
Harré, R. and Madden, E. H. (1975). Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.
Hume, D. (1740). «Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature». In: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P. Millican (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 133-45.
Hume, (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. P. Millican (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. N. Kemp Smith trans. London: MacMillan, 1929.
Lewis, D. (1973). «Causation». In: Philosophical Papers II, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 159-213.
Lewis, D. (2004). «Void and Object». In: Collins, Hall and Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004: 277-90.
Lipton, P. (1999). «All Else Being Equal». Philosophy, 74: 155-68.
Martin, C. B. (1994). «Dispositions and Conditionals». The Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 1-8.
Martin, C. B. (2008). The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, D. H. (1971). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, D. H. (1988). «On Raising the Chances of Effects». In: Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 225-34.
Mellor, D. H. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic. London: Parker.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. S. Mumford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in Nature. Abingdon: Routledge.
Mumford, S. (2009). «Passing Powers Around». The Monist, 92: 94-111.
Newton, I (1687). Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. A. Motte trans. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1792, revised by F. Cajori,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schaffer, J. (2004). «Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to Their Effects: the Case for negative Causation«. In: Hitchcock (ed.) Contemporary Debates in
Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Blackwell: 197-216.
Schrenk, M. (2008). «Hic Rhodos, hic Salta. From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions». In: G. Damschen, R. Schnepf, K. Stueber (eds.) Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Sosa, E. (1980). «Varieties of Causation». In: E. Sosa and M. Tooley (eds), Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 234-42.
Publicado
2021-05-17
Cómo citar
[1]
Anjum , R.L. y Mumford, S. 2021. Powers as Causal Truthmakers. Disputatio. 3, 4 (may 2021), 5-31.
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Artículos y Ensayos
Derechos de autor 2014 Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin
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