Is Frege’s puzzle based on Psychological Data?

David Suárez-Rivero

doi:10.5281/zenodo.7297562

David Suárez-Rivero Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, Costa Rica

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7297562

Keywords: Frege's Puzzle, Frege's Data, Epistemology, Psychology, Semantics

Abstract

In this paper, I explore and evaluate Frege’s data. Different from I call the traditional conception – especially those proposals provided by Howard Wettstein, Nathan Salmon and John Perry in the 80’s, which I take as representative philosophers from the traditional conception –, I support that Frege’s puzzle cannot be based on psychological data. I hold that only epistemic data can cause Frege’s puzzle and explain what are these epistemic data and the difference between these data and the psychological one, considering and replying to a possible objection.

Author Biography

David Suárez-Rivero, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, Costa Rica

David Suárez-Rivero is a permanent professor at the National University of Costa Rica. His areas of interest are Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Logic and Argumentation. He obtained his Ph. D. at the University of Barcelona, Spain. His Master and Bachelor Degrees were received from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. After a Post-doctoral Research at the National University of Costa Rica, he worked as a Post-doctoral Researcher at the State University of Campinas, Brazil.

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Is Frege’s puzzle based on Psychological Data?

Abstract

Author Biography

References

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