Comments on Saul Kripke’s Philosophical Troubles
Abstract
This is a discussion of some loosely connected issues in Saul Kripke’s articles «The First Person» and «Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference».
References
Kaplan, David (1989). «Demonstratives». In: Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563.
Kripke, Saul A. (2011). Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers. Vol. I. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David (1979). «Attitudes de Dicto and de Se». Philosophical Review 88, pp. 513–43. doi: 10.2307/2184843. reprinted in: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 133–156. doi: 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
Perry, John (1979). «The Problem of the Essential Indexical». Noûs 13, pp. 26–49. doi: 10.2307/2214792
Perry, John (1986). «Perception, Action, and the Structure of Believing». In: Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, edited by Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 333–61. reprinted in: The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 121–149.
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