On the permanence of metaphysics

Abstract

In the last decades, we have witnessed a renaissance of discussions on metaphysics within the Analytic Philosophy. Nowadays, philosophers of this tradition started a refoundation movement, in which they try to establish its concept and possibility. Concerning the concept, metaphysics is identified with ontology, which objective would be to outline the fundamental structure of reality. They believe that it retakes the Aristotelian project of searching for being and, at the same time that refuse the Kantian Idealism, they believe they are founding the possibility of a transcendent metaphysics. In this article, we have three objectives. In the first place, we raise some questions that arise regarding this concept of metaphysics. Second, we criticize the arguments about its possibility. Finally, we present our own position about its nature and possibility, in dialogue with Paul Gilbert’s discussion, in «Permanência da metafísica». Gilbert defends that metaphysics remains alive in the sense of the Greek term «meta», not contemplated by the technical and scientific perspective of analytic ontology. Considering his conception as correct, we add that metaphysics is constituted by transcendent problems, which are the reason for the reflections of this field, and responsible for the effort to overcome the empirical towards metaphysics.