What does it mean to belong to a community?
Abstract
The present article develops the notion of community and how it is instituted by way of discursive social practices, governed by training for practice and following rules —taken from the Investigations and On Certainty— as interpretative keys that help us justify the notion that communities are created from the «I–Thou» type inter–subjectivity maintained by Brandom. The social pragmatism on which this proposal is based, allows us to articulate —under the perspective we find in Wittgenstein’s work– the dynamics of institution and the development of a community, understanding what belonging to it it means and implies, what consequences following a rule one way or another has. This new description on terms of belonging to a community allows us to understand rationality in pragmatic terms, in so far as being rational means taking part in the game of giving and asking for the reasons that such community finds as binding, as suggested in Making it explicit.
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