Frege's role in the history of logic

  • Lorenzo Peña Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, España
Keywords: Quantifiers, Nonclassical Logic, Combinatory Logic, Functions, Truth-Values

Abstract

While Kant's claim has been discredited — namely that logic had, by his time, neither progressed nor regressed ever since Aristotle — both the exact reason while he was wrong and the partial core of truth his assertion contained ought to be elucidated. Aristotle's was a logic of terms that ignored the calculus of statements, cultivated instead by the Stoic logicians and later Scholastics. However a unified — yet unsuccessful — logical account of terms and propositions was attempted by Leibniz. It was an anticipation of modern combinatory logic. Leibniz's successors took over his reduction of logic to a certain mathematical calculus. Boole asserted that all logical truths were algebraic equations. Nevertheless, existential statements showed themselves unamenable to his approach. It was Frege who really made a giant step forward by resorting to variables and inventing the quantifier, thanks to his theory of objects and functions. Thus, Aristotle's logic was at last somehaw overcome. Not quite, though, since both Aristotle's and Frege's accounts share common assumptions, which have been put to rest by nonclassical logics such as combinatory and many-valued logics.

Author Biography

Lorenzo Peña, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, España

Lorenzo Peña es Profesor de Investigación jubilado del Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, España. Doctor en Filosofía [≈ PhD] por la Universidad de Lieja, Bélgica y Doctor en Derecho [≈ PhD] por la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España. Su investigación actual se centra en el desarrollo de una ontología jurídica. Es autor, entre otras, de las siguientes obras: Visión lógica del derecho (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 2017); Introducción a las lógicas no-clásicas (México: UNAM, 1993); El ente y su ser: un estudio lógico-metafísico (León: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Univ. de León, 1985).

Published
2021-06-30
How to Cite
[1]
Peña, L. 2021. Frege’s role in the history of logic. Disputatio. 10, 17 (Jun. 2021), 207-230. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5168811.
Section
Articles and Essays