Emotions and their Relation to Cognition: Reflections about Anthony Kenny’s Objections against Feeling Theories

  • Andrea F. Melamed Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (SADAF), Argentina
Keywords: Emotion, Cognitive Theories, Somatic Theories

Abstract

This paper takes as its focus William James’ (1884, 1890) and Anthony Kenny’s (1963) proposals and strives to show that their point of view is better understood when interpreted as proposals for investigations with different objectives and placed at different angles of complex research revolving around emotions. As James and Kenny are conceived, furthermore, as paradigmatic authors of, respectively, the none-cognitive and cognitive perspectives, this approach to the interpretation of their positions will create new access routes for a dialogue between the traditions and will establish new grounds for a reconciliation between these conceptions in a more ample framework.

Author Biography

Andrea F. Melamed, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (SADAF), Argentina

Andrea F. Melamed is a Lecturer at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and a Researcher at the Sociedad
Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF), Argentina. PhD in Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires. Her
main interests are the philosophy of psychology, neuropsychology and the neuroscience. She is also interested in metaphysics, philosophy of logic and logic in general.

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Published
2018-12-31
How to Cite
[1]
Melamed, A.F. 2018. Emotions and their Relation to Cognition: Reflections about Anthony Kenny’s Objections against Feeling Theories. Disputatio. 7, 8 (Dec. 2018), a004. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2550913.
Section
Articles and Essays