Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology

  • Jean Héring University of Minnesotta, USA
  • Gilson Olegario da Silva Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Brasil
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7407401
Keywords: pragmática, framework, Carnap, ontology, pragmatics

Abstract

Utilizing Carnap's notions of “questions [or assertions] within a framework” and “questions [or assertions] about a framework” and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities — in particular, that of theoretical entities — is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined.

Author Biographies

Jean Héring, University of Minnesotta, USA

Grover Edward Maxwell foi professor da Universidade de Minnesota e membro (e diretor) do Centro para a Filosofia da Ciência na mesma universidade.

Gilson Olegario da Silva, Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Brasil

Gilson Olegario da Silva atualmente é professor no Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Brasil. Doutor em Filosofia [≈ PhD] pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas – Unicamp, com a tese: «Os empiristas vão à missa: compromissos ontológicos e frameworks linguísticos». Seus principais interesses concentram–se nos problemas circunscritos à Ontologia, Metametafísica, História & Filosofia da Ciência, ao Positivismo Lógico e a reavaliação da filosofia de Rudolf Carnap; principalmente nos fundamentos das teorias científicas e na sua estruturação formal.

References

Carnap, Rudolf (1957) “Beobachtungssprache and theoretische Sprache”, Dialectica, 12: pp. 236-248.

Carnap, Rudolf (1950) “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4(11), pp. 20-40; reimpresso em Meaning and Necessity, 2ª ed., Chicago Univ. Press, 1955.

Carnap, Rudolf (1952) “Meaning Postulates”, Philos. Studies, 3: pp. 65-73.

Feigl, Herbert (1950) “De principiis non disputandum?” em M. Black (ed.) Philosophical Analysis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Feigl, Herbert (1950) “Existential Hypotheses”, Philosophy of Science 17: pp. 35-62.

Feyerabend, Paul. K. (1958) “An Attemptd at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 58: pp. 144-170.

Grünbaum, Adolf (1962) “Geometry, Chronometry, and Empiricism”, em Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 405–526.

Maxwell, Grover. e Feigl, Herbert. (1961) “Why Ordinary Language Needs Reforming”, Journal of Philosophy, 58: pp. 488-498.

Maxwell, Grover (1961) “Meaning Postulates in Scientific Theories”, em Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., pp. 169--183.

Maxwell, Grover (1962) “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities”, em Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 132–138.

Scriven, Michael (1958) “Definitions, Explanations, and Theories”, em Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99–195.

Sellars, Wilfrid (1956) “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind”, em Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 253–329.

Sellars, Wilfrid (1960) “Grammar and Existence: a Preface to Ontology”, Mind 69 – 276, pp. 499–533.

Sellars, Wilfrid (1954) “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21: pp. 204–228.

Sellars, Wilfrid (1961) “The Language of Theories”. In Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.

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Published
2021-12-31
How to Cite
[1]
Maxwell, G. and da Silva, G.O. 2021. Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology. Disputatio. 10, 19 (Dec. 2021), 183-194. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7407401.
Issue
Vol. 10 No. 19 (2021)
Section
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