Manipulando sombras: Hacia una (di)solución evidencialista del problema de la exclusión causal

Lorenzo Baravalle

doi:10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3594058

Lorenzo Baravalle Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3594058

Keywords: Supervenience, Causal Models, Manipulationism, Evidentialism

Abstract

A classic problem in philosophy of mind is the possible exclusion of mental causes with respect to the physical ones. This problem, popularised by Jaegwon Kim, has undesirable consequences for any scientific discipline committed with causal claims related to supervenient properties. Focusing on issues concerning causal claims in the special sciences, I discuss in this paper the solution to the causal exclusion problem put forward by a group of authors occasionally called «evidentialists». Evidentialists consider that causal exclusion problem can be solved by appealing to the manipulationist notion of cause, originally formulated by James Woodward. Throughout the last 10 year, the evidentialist view has received some criticisms by Michael Baumgartner. My goal is to show in which respects these criticisms are correct, but do not compromise the overall validity of the evidentialist view.

Author Biography

Lorenzo Baravalle, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

LORENZO BARAVALLE es actualmente miembro del Departamento de Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad de Lisboa (Portugal), así como del Centro de Ciencias Naturales y Humanas de la Universidad Federal del ABC (Brasil). Obtuvo su Doctorado en Filosofía [≈ PhD] en la Universidad de Barcelona y en la Universidad Rovira i Virgili (España). Está interesado en los intentos de generalización de la teoría evolutiva a dominios no estrictamente biológicos, tales como la cultura, la computación, y la epistemología. Ha publicado sobre tópico relacionados con la estructura teórica de la teoría evolutiva y las explicaciones evolutivas.

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Manipulating Shadows: Towards an Evidentialist (Dis)solution of the Causal Exclusion Problem

Abstract

Author Biography

References

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