Models of Experience: Towards an Empirical Husserlian Phenomenology

Abstract

The theory of science that Husserl developed in his Prolegomena establishes a formal semantic counterpart made up of formal semantic categories and a formal ontological counterpart made up of formal ontological categories. In the third of his Logical Investigations, Husserl sets about developing this a priori theory of the ways that parts of an object can be combined so as to be considered a whole. In this theory, he proposes, designs, and develops different formal relationships between different types of parts in order to account for different types of wholes. In this presentation, I put forward the following thesis: Husserl applies his own formal ontology to the phenomenological realm, which results in models of this realm. By «model», I mean the result of the application of a formal structure with known properties to a realm that one is seeking to know. As such, the validity of the model will depend on its being corroborated empirically. The textual evidence for this is to be found in the third of the Logical Investigations and in others texts by Husserl from throughout his life.