Dos formas de quietismo: ¿De qué se puede hablar en filosofía?

Manuel de Pinedo García

doi:10.5281/zenodo.3236912

Manuel de Pinedo Universidad de Granada, Spain

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3236912

Keywords: Wittgenstein, John McDowell, Particularism, Rule Following, Externalism

Abstract

En este trabajo exploro dos formas de ser quietista en filosofía y las relaciono con la filosofía de Wittgenstein y McDowell. En un primer sentido, el quietismo podría entenderse como la obligación de permanecer silencioso con respecto a las cuestiones que más valoramos. Los aforismos finales del Tractatus parecen apuntar en esta dirección. El segundo sentido es una negativa a producir teorías filosóficas con respecto a cuestiones generales y abstractas como el significado o el pensamiento. McDowell ha presentado una lectura en esta última línea de las Investigaciones y ha seguido esta dirección en la mayoría de su propia filosofía. Discuto algunas consecuencias de este segundo enfoque para el seguimiento de reglas, el externismo sobre lo mental y el particularismo ético e intento mostrar que hay muchas posibilidades de realizar investigación filosófica de importancia incluso tras el abandono de las grandes pretensiones teóricas.

Author Biography

Manuel de Pinedo, Universidad de Granada, Spain

Manuel de Pinedo is a lecturer at the Filosofía I department, University of Granada, Spain. He obtained his PhD at Sussex University (UK, 2000) and joined the University of Granada, where he still works, as a Ramón y Cajal fellow. His research has focused on a variety of issues from the philosophy of mind, biology and the cognitive sciences, to epistemology and metaphysics. He has published in journals such as Synthese, Biology & Philosophy, Theoria, Teorema, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Frontiers in Psychology or Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. He is proud to collaborate with a good number of academics and philosophers, including several present and former PhD students. At the moment he is very much committed to the political turn in analytic philosophy and leads, with María José Frápolli and Neftalí Villanueva, a very active research group.

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Two Forms of Quietism: What can be Spoken About in Philosophy?

Abstract

Author Biography

References

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