Frege, truth and scientific progress
Abstract
The present paper shows the continuity, through the work of Frege and the context of his characterization of scientific doing, of a notion of truth that is neither constructive nor instrumental, and can’t even be understood as a relation of correspondence or adaptation. It is a primitive and undefined concept, which is intended to be taken through its ultimate consequences –something that Frege did not come to do. The author supports, finally, an alternative notion of truth that could be seen as a condition of possibility of any epistemic attitude.
References
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