The role of metaphysical research programs in advancing science in Popper's thought

Abstract

Popper, when trying to draw a demarcation line between science and metaphysics, is faced with the problem of the influence of metaphysics on the emergence of scientific theories, which leads him to think about how these two orders of knowledge interrelate. The aim of this paper is to analyze, precisely, the question of the relationship between science and metaphysics in Popper's thought. We will highlight, more specifically, the role of “metaphysical research programs” for scientific advancement. By dealing with this issue, we intend to elucidate an apparent ambiguity in the philosopher's thinking, because, while he understands science and metaphysics as knowledge of different natures, he defends the thesis that metaphysics is a source of inspiration and hypotheses for scientists and contributing to the development of science. We understand that this ambiguity disappears if we consider that Popper, when dealing with such relationships and distinctions, conceives them from a double perspective: one that examines theories from the perspective of their logical-methodological criterion and seeks to distinguish them, and the other that, in view of the historical evolution of science, considers metaphysics as a way of directing scientific investigations.