On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”

  • Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Keywords: Truth, Degrees of Truth, Empirical Sciencies, Formal Sciences

Abstract

One of the most notable theses Bunge defended regarding the concept of truth in empirical sciences was that it comes in degrees, in contrast to the usual assumption that there are only two truth-values, an assumption which according to him is fully adequate only for the formal disciplines of logic and pure mathematics. This paper discusses Bunge’s successive attempts at formulating an axiomatic theory of partial truth. I will briefly point out the formal defects of his earlier theories and I will prove that the latest formulations of his theory (made by himself and G. E. Romero) are still not adequate – the most recent one being, in fact, inconsistent.

Author Biography

Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Spain

Alejandro Gracia di Rienzo is a Phd candidate at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain). His research interests include the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics.

References

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Published
2023-06-27
How to Cite
[1]
Gracia Di Rienzo, A. 2023. On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth” . Disputatio. (Jun. 2023), 0-00.
Issue
Online First
Section
Critical Notes

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