Tiempo y verdad: acerca de las relaciones entre algunas tesis metafísicas y semánticas
Palabras clave:
Futuros Contingentes, Eternismo, Determinismo, Principio de Bivalencia
Resumen
Neste artigo, meu objetivo será identificar a relação entre algumas teses metafísicas (eternismo e determinismo) e semânticas (futuro fechado e futuro aberto). Uma vez tendo isso por estabelecido, irei postular dois princípios (princípio de determinação metafísico-semântico e princípio de indeterminação semântico-metafísico), os quais pretendo tornar disponíveis para debates filosóficos, como por exemplo o debate sobre os futuros contingentes e suas variantes. Os princípios em questão resumem a contribuição que as relações entre as teses podem oferecer, quando bem estabelecidas. Após tudo, veremos que não podemos deduzir destas teses semânticas aquelas teses metafísicas, embora possamos passar das teses metafísicas para as teses semânticas em questão.
Referencias
Aristotle. (1966). Categories and De Interpretatione. J. H. Ackrill (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Armstrong, David Malet (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583308
Balaguer, Mark (2016). «Anti–Metaphycalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92: pp. 145–167. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12129
Belnap, Nuel (1992). «Branching Space–Time». Synthese 92: pp. 385–434. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414289
Belnap, Nuel, e Green, Mitchell. (1994). «Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line». Philosophical Perspectives 8: pp. 365–388. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214178
Earman, John (1986). A Primer On Determinism. Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9072-8
Everett, Hugh (1957). «Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics». Reviews of Modern Physics 29: pp. 454–462. https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454
Fleck, Almeida (1997). O problema dos futuros contingentes. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, pp. 12–13.
Haack, Susan (1998). Filosofia das Lógicas. Tradução de Cezar Augusto Mortari e Luiz Henrique Dutra. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, pp. 274–277.
Hugh, Rice (2015). «Fatalism». In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Acessado em: Março, 15 de 2017: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/fatalism/.
Inwagen, Peter van (1975). «The incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism». Philosophical Studies 27: pp.185–199. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01624156
Inwagen, Peter Van (1983). An Essay of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Łukasiewicz, Jan (1967). «Philosophical remarks on many–valued systems of propositional logic». In: S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40–65. Original de 1930.
Markosian, Ned (1995). «The open past». Philosophical Studies 79, no. 1: pp. 95–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989786
Mctaggart, J. Ellis (1908). «The Unreality of Time». Mind 18: pp. 457–484. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457
Ockham, William (1969). Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents (trans: Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann), New York.
Putnam, Hilary (1967). «Time and Physical Geometry». Journal of Philosophy, 64, pp. 240–247. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024493
Rea, Michael e Finch, Alicia (2008). «Presentism and Ockham’s Way Out». Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, pp. 1–17.
Rea, Michael (2003). «Four–Dimensionalism». In: Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246–280.
Rea, Michael (2006). «Presentism and Fatalism». Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4: pp. 511–524. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400601079003
Rosenkranz, Sven (2012). «In Defence of Ockhamism». Philosophia 40, no. 3, pp. 617–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9337-2
Russell, Bertrand (1915). «On the Experience of Time». The Monist 25: pp. 212–33. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191525217
Ryle, Gilbert (1953). Dilemmas. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Schlick, Moritz (1954). «Die Kausalitaet in der gegenwartigen Physik». Naturwissenschaften 19: pp. 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01516406
Sehon, Scott (2011). «A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument». Analysis 71, no. 1: pp. 30–38. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq117
Sider, Theodore (2001). Four–Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
Smart, Jack (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Smart, Jack (2008). «The tenseless theory of time», in: Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, pp. 226–238,
Vranas, Peter B. M (2005). «Do cry over spilt milk: Possibly you can change the past». Monist 88, no. 3: pp. 370–377. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200588315.
Armstrong, David Malet (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583308
Balaguer, Mark (2016). «Anti–Metaphycalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92: pp. 145–167. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12129
Belnap, Nuel (1992). «Branching Space–Time». Synthese 92: pp. 385–434. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414289
Belnap, Nuel, e Green, Mitchell. (1994). «Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line». Philosophical Perspectives 8: pp. 365–388. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214178
Earman, John (1986). A Primer On Determinism. Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9072-8
Everett, Hugh (1957). «Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics». Reviews of Modern Physics 29: pp. 454–462. https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454
Fleck, Almeida (1997). O problema dos futuros contingentes. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, pp. 12–13.
Haack, Susan (1998). Filosofia das Lógicas. Tradução de Cezar Augusto Mortari e Luiz Henrique Dutra. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, pp. 274–277.
Hugh, Rice (2015). «Fatalism». In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Acessado em: Março, 15 de 2017: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/fatalism/.
Inwagen, Peter van (1975). «The incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism». Philosophical Studies 27: pp.185–199. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01624156
Inwagen, Peter Van (1983). An Essay of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Łukasiewicz, Jan (1967). «Philosophical remarks on many–valued systems of propositional logic». In: S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40–65. Original de 1930.
Markosian, Ned (1995). «The open past». Philosophical Studies 79, no. 1: pp. 95–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989786
Mctaggart, J. Ellis (1908). «The Unreality of Time». Mind 18: pp. 457–484. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457
Ockham, William (1969). Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents (trans: Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann), New York.
Putnam, Hilary (1967). «Time and Physical Geometry». Journal of Philosophy, 64, pp. 240–247. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024493
Rea, Michael e Finch, Alicia (2008). «Presentism and Ockham’s Way Out». Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, pp. 1–17.
Rea, Michael (2003). «Four–Dimensionalism». In: Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246–280.
Rea, Michael (2006). «Presentism and Fatalism». Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4: pp. 511–524. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400601079003
Rosenkranz, Sven (2012). «In Defence of Ockhamism». Philosophia 40, no. 3, pp. 617–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9337-2
Russell, Bertrand (1915). «On the Experience of Time». The Monist 25: pp. 212–33. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191525217
Ryle, Gilbert (1953). Dilemmas. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Schlick, Moritz (1954). «Die Kausalitaet in der gegenwartigen Physik». Naturwissenschaften 19: pp. 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01516406
Sehon, Scott (2011). «A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument». Analysis 71, no. 1: pp. 30–38. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq117
Sider, Theodore (2001). Four–Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
Smart, Jack (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Smart, Jack (2008). «The tenseless theory of time», in: Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, pp. 226–238,
Vranas, Peter B. M (2005). «Do cry over spilt milk: Possibly you can change the past». Monist 88, no. 3: pp. 370–377. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200588315.
Publicado
2018-12-31
Cómo citar
[1]
Marques, E. 2018. Tiempo y verdad: acerca de las relaciones entre algunas tesis metafísicas y semánticas. Disputatio. 7, 8 (dic. 2018), a001. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2550524.
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