¿Cuál podría ser la gran deuda con Frege? o Gottlobius ab paene omni naevo vindicatus

  • Sanford Shieh Wesleyan University, Estados Unidos
Palabras clave: Leyes lógicas, Inferencia, Actitudes proposicionales, Negación, Normatividad, Representación, Verdad y falsedad

Resumen

En este trabajo examino algunas interpretaciones de la crítica que Wittgenstein hace a la concepción de lógica de Frege. Una se basa en el rechazo de Frege del psicologismo y alega que este rechazo engendra una tensión que es resuelta en el Tractatus. Otra más se basa en la afirmación de que hay patrones de inferencias involucrando lo que se conoce como adscripciones de actitudes proposicionales, alegando que la concepción de la lógica de Frege no es capaz de manejarlas. Cinco otras apelan a dificultades que supuestamente surgen a raíz del punto de vista de Frege de los pensamientos como sentidos de los nombres dos valores de verdad. Yo demuestro que ninguna de estas interpretaciones presenta una crítica contundente de Frege. Sugiero, entonces, que Wittgenstein heredó de Frege una idea que es el fundamento de la afirmación de Frege, de que cada pensamiento tiene un «opuesto», de manera que rechazar el pensamiento como falso es afirmar que lo opuesto sea verdadero. Hay cierta tensión, sin embargo, entre esta idea fundamental de Frege y la concepción de los pensamientos como la representación del caer de objetos bajo conceptos, y su concepción de la negación como (expresando) una función veritativa. Resolver esta tensión en el Tractatus involucra (a) su Grundgedanke de que ni la negación ni ninguna otra «constante lógica» sea un elemento representativo en nuestro retratar del mundo, y (b) una concepción fundamentalmente modal del retratar de las proposiciones, la cual requiere una concepción primitiva de la posibilidad.

Biografía del autor/a

Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University, Estados Unidos

Sanford Shieh is professor of philosophy at Wesleyan University. He studied at Cornell University (AB 1981), Oxford (B.A. 1983) and Harvard (Ph.D. 1993). He is author of the book Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy, vol. 1, Oxford University Press (2019), coedited The Limits of Logical Empiricism: Selected Papers of Arthur Pap, with AlfonsKeupink, Springer (2006). Reading Stanley Cavell  with Alice Crary, Routledge (2006). Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, with JulietFloyd, Oxford University Press (2001), and he published a large number of articles and book reviews.

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Publicado
2021-09-30
Cómo citar
[1]
Shieh, S. 2021. ¿Cuál podría ser la gran deuda con Frege? o Gottlobius ab paene omni naevo vindicatus. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin. 10, 18 (sep. 2021), 5-62. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5610303.