Cómo ser un realista sobre especies naturales
Palabras clave:
Especies naturales, Realismo, Anti-realismo
Resumen
No obstante de que algunos autores sostienen que especies naturales son necesariamente relativas a los dominios de disciplinas, hay muchos autores que suponen que especies naturales tienen que ser características absolutas, categóricas de la realidad — suponiéndolo sin siquiera hacer mención de la alternativa. Pero una vez que se reconozcan ambas posibilidades, uno se podría preguntar si la diferencia es particularmente importante. Yo arguyo que sí. Con remisión a argumentos recientes arguyo que la cuestión del realismo se ilumina de la mejor manera si pensamos de la especiedad natural como de una relación que se da entre una categoría y un dominio.
Referencias
Bird, Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin (2015). “Natural kinds”. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring. url: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/natural-kinds/
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1982). “Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (1980), vol. 2: pp. 613–662.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1990). “Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method”. In C. Wade Savage, editor, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. XIV, pp. 355–391. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1991). “Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds”. Philosophical Studies 61: pp. 127–148.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1999a). “Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa”. In Robert A. Wilson, editor, Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 141–185. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1999b). “Kinds as the “workmanship of men”: Realism, constructivism, and natural kinds”. In Julian Nida-Rümelin, editor, Rationalität, Realismus, Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, pp. 52–89, Berlin. Walter de Gruyter.
Franklin-Hall, L. R. (2015). “Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks”. Philosophical Studies 172, no. 4: pp. 925–948, April. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0326-8
Godman, Marion (2014). review of Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 3: pp. 343–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.953346
Goodman, Nelson (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
Hacking, Ian (1991). “A tradition of natural kinds”. Philosophical Studies 61: pp. 109–126. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00385836
Hacking, Ian (2007). “Natural kinds: Rosy dawn, scholastic twilight”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82: pp. 203–239. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000203
Harman, Graham (2010). Towards Speculative Realism. Zero Books, Winchester, UK.
Hendry, Robin Findlay (2010). “The elements and conceptual change”. In Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, editors, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, pp. 137–158. Routledge, New York.
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2013). Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511998553
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2016). “Mind-dependent kinds”. Journal of Social Ontology 2, no. 2: pp. 223–246. https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0045
Magnus, P.D. (2012). Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271259
Magnus, P.D. (2014a). “Epistemic categories and causal kinds”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48, B: pp. 263–266, December.
Magnus, P.D. (2014b). “No grist for Mill on natural kinds”. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2, no. 4: pp. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v2i4.35
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1877). “How to make our ideas clear”. In Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, editors, The Essential Peirce, vol. 1, pp. 124–141. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992. Originally published 1877.
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1982). “Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (1980), vol. 2: pp. 613–662.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1990). “Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method”. In C. Wade Savage, editor, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. XIV, pp. 355–391. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1991). “Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds”. Philosophical Studies 61: pp. 127–148.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1999a). “Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa”. In Robert A. Wilson, editor, Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 141–185. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Boyd, Richard [N.] (1999b). “Kinds as the “workmanship of men”: Realism, constructivism, and natural kinds”. In Julian Nida-Rümelin, editor, Rationalität, Realismus, Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, pp. 52–89, Berlin. Walter de Gruyter.
Franklin-Hall, L. R. (2015). “Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks”. Philosophical Studies 172, no. 4: pp. 925–948, April. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0326-8
Godman, Marion (2014). review of Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 3: pp. 343–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.953346
Goodman, Nelson (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
Hacking, Ian (1991). “A tradition of natural kinds”. Philosophical Studies 61: pp. 109–126. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00385836
Hacking, Ian (2007). “Natural kinds: Rosy dawn, scholastic twilight”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82: pp. 203–239. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000203
Harman, Graham (2010). Towards Speculative Realism. Zero Books, Winchester, UK.
Hendry, Robin Findlay (2010). “The elements and conceptual change”. In Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, editors, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, pp. 137–158. Routledge, New York.
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2013). Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511998553
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2016). “Mind-dependent kinds”. Journal of Social Ontology 2, no. 2: pp. 223–246. https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0045
Magnus, P.D. (2012). Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271259
Magnus, P.D. (2014a). “Epistemic categories and causal kinds”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48, B: pp. 263–266, December.
Magnus, P.D. (2014b). “No grist for Mill on natural kinds”. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2, no. 4: pp. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v2i4.35
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1877). “How to make our ideas clear”. In Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, editors, The Essential Peirce, vol. 1, pp. 124–141. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992. Originally published 1877.
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Publicado
2018-12-31
Cómo citar
[1]
Magnus, P.D. 2018. Cómo ser un realista sobre especies naturales. Disputatio. 7, 8 (dic. 2018), a016. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2553734.
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