La matemática, la intuición y el lenguaje en la primera Crítica y en el Tractatus
Resumen
La proposición 6.233 del Tractatus de Wittgenstein se ha ido leyendo como un rechazo de la afirmación kantiana de que la matemática esté basada en la intuición. Contrariamente a contribuciones previas estoy desarrollando una lectura de la Crítica y del Tracatus que muestra que los dos tenían un entendimiento similar acerca del tipo de explicación que la matemática requiere. Lo hago concentrándome en una similitud estructural fundamental entre la nocion de Satz (proposición) tractariana y la kantiana de Erkenntnis (conocimiento). Arguyo que se puede hacer una lectura fecunda de una gran parte de la terminología fundamental de las dos obras como resultado de un análisis de estas dos nociones en términos de forma y materia; además, ambos términos se entienden mejor si se considera su uso paradigmático: conocimiento empírico para Kant y proposiciones significativas para Wittgenstein. Este análisis nos permite obtener un mejor entendimiento de la intuición pura de Kant y de la forma lógica tractariana de símbolos proposicionales que ilumina los dominios en los cuales los dos autores piensan que la matemática está operando.
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