

# Language Disguises Thought: Uncovering the Origins of the Clothing Metaphor in *Tractatus* 4.002


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**I**N WHAT FOLLOWS, I INVESTIGATE THE ORIGINS of the clothing metaphor in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus* (hereafter *Tractatus*) at remark 4.002, and consider the context of the remark and some associated remarks. I trace the antecedents, and original sources of the remark, and the influences upon Wittgenstein in writing the remark, especially in regard to the clothing metaphor in 4.002(4), the fourth paragraph.

In Section 1, I begin by noting a striking similarity between Wittgenstein’s use of the metaphor in the *Tractatus* and Frege’s use of it in his article “Der Gedanke” (1918), before considering an antecedent text to remark 4.002, in the earlier manuscript MS104 and various changes and interchanges that were made to the text.

In Section 2, I trace the antecedents of 4.002 found in MS104 to their sources, beginning from those antecedents identified in MS104. Many of the sources have already been put forward in the literature, and can be found in the *Notes on Logic* (1913, hereafter *Notes*) and the *Notebooks 1914–1916* (hereafter *Notebooks*). In addition to these I will suggest a potential source text for the third paragraph of 4.002, and argue in favour of a source for the first sentence of the fourth paragraph (4.002(4a)). In the subsequent section, I provide reasons to think that Wittgenstein may have been influenced here by a passage of Frege’s “On Concept and Object” if not by conversations with Frege himself.

In Section 3, I trace the influences on Wittgenstein that may have led to his use of the extended clothing metaphor that we find in the remainder of the fourth paragraph of remark 4.002. I discuss a number of clothing metaphors used by other authors and their potential influence or otherwise upon

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Wittgenstein, including passages from Hertz, Boltzmann, Frege, and Kraus. Many of these texts have not been considered previously in other discussions in the literature. I argue that there is one particularly salient instance of the metaphor in Kraus' *Die Fackel* that we should consider to have been the main influence upon Wittgenstein's own use of the clothing metaphor.

## § 1. The antecedents of remark 4.002 in MS104

In this section we begin by considering a very striking similarity between two uses of clothing metaphors by Wittgenstein and Frege, before tracing Wittgenstein's use to an earlier draft in MS104. The following is Wittgenstein's famous clothing metaphor from remark 4.002(4) of the *Tractatus*:

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 22)<sup>1</sup>.

Frege also uses a similar clothing metaphor in his article "Thought" ("Der Gedanke", 1918), which was the first of a trio of articles that he published towards the end of his career.

The thought, in itself imperceptible by the senses, gets clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to grasp it. We say a sentence expresses a thought (Frege 1997, p. 328)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> "Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, daß man nach der äußeren Form des Kleides, nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann ; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist, als danach [,] die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen" (Wittgenstein 1921, p. 212; cf. Wittgenstein 1981, p. 62). The 1922/33 version includes the comma after *danach* and renders "ß" as "ss".

<sup>2</sup> "Der an sich unsinnliche Gedanke kleidet sich in das sinnliche Gewand des Satzes und wird uns damit faßbarer. Wir sagen, der Satz drücke einen Gedanken aus" (Frege 1918, p. 61). This has also been translated as: "The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought" (Frege 1968, p. 511, trans. A. M. and M. Quinton). The use of the terms "material" and "immaterial" in this translation is an interpretative inference from the original, which was instead focused on availability to perception.

The two authors appear somewhat opposed to each other regarding this point. For Wittgenstein, the form of thought is disguised by being clothed in language, but, for Frege, a thought's being so clothed is our only means of grasping it, as it is itself imperceptible. Of course, the two intend different notions of "thought" (*Gedanke*). For Frege, thoughts are the senses of sentences and the proper bearers of truth values. They are not psychological ideas, rather, they are objective objects of a "third realm" (1997, p. 337), which require the clothing of language in order to be grasped. For Wittgenstein, thoughts consist of psychical constituents and are pictures that have their logical form in common with reality<sup>3</sup>. They can be expressed in propositions consisting of words, but this clothing in language disguises the form of the thought.

It is uncertain what connection, if any, there is between the two passages. One might initially be tempted to think that because the *Tractatus* was published after Frege's article, it includes a response to the latter. However, Wittgenstein had completed the *Tractatus* just as Frege's article was being prepared for publication. This is evident from the Frege–Wittgenstein correspondence, of which we have only some of Frege's side and a list of dates and notes made by Heinrich Scholz, who had catalogued Wittgenstein's side among Frege's other papers before this was destroyed when Münster library was bombed in 1945 (Floyd 2011, pp. 1–2). On the 12<sup>th</sup> of September 1918, Frege mentions the possibility of such a reciprocal exchange. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of October, Frege replies to congratulate Wittgenstein on the conclusion of his work and mentions his hope that he will be able to send Wittgenstein "something soon", by which he meant a copy of his article "Der Gedanke" (Dreben & Floyd (eds) 2011, pp. 46 ff.). Wittgenstein's sister, Hermine, wrote to Frege on the 24<sup>th</sup> of December 1918, to inform him that her brother "was placed in a prisoner of war camp and that a typescript of his 'work' (later known as the *Tractatus*) would be sent to Frege" (Floyd 2011, p. 12). There is then a follow up communication in March 1919 due to some missing pages. Wittgenstein soon writes again, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April, with a "Request for judgement about the work" (Floyd 2011, p. 12). Frege eventually replies on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919 regarding his thoughts and misgivings about the *Tractatus*, and Wittgenstein addresses Frege's article (Dreben & Floyd (eds) 2011, pp. 50 ff.), thanking him for it on the 16<sup>th</sup> of

<sup>3</sup> In response to Russell's question "Does a *Gedanke* consist of words?" (13.8.1919, in McGuinness 2008, p. 96), Wittgenstein replies "No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know" (19.8.1919, in McGuinness 2008, p. 99).

September 1919 (von Wright 1979, p. 114, n. 37). So, notwithstanding earlier exchanges of views between the two authors<sup>4</sup>, each of their two works appears not to have had any direct influence upon, or connection with, the other's development prior to their completion.

Further, Wittgenstein's above quoted use of the clothing metaphor from 4.002 appears with minor differences in an earlier manuscript, MS104, in propositions 4.0014 and 4.00141. I reproduce them here as they appear in their context as comments upon 4 and 4.001 in the translation of the *Prototractatus*.

- 4           A thought is a proposition with a sense.
- 4.001       The totality of propositions is the language.
- 4.0011     Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is — just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.
- 4.0012     Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
- 4.0013     It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
- 4.0014     It disguises thought.
- 4.00141    So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but with quite different things in view (Wittgenstein 1971, p. 83).

We can see from this that most of what eventually becomes remark 4.002 of the *Tractatus* is already in place in MS104, in remarks 4.0011 (p. 30) and 4.0012–4.00141 (p. 36). These comments on remark 4.001 later become the first four paragraphs of remark 4.002, and so paragraphs of a sibling remark in the *Tractatus*. Other than a number of commas being added, and the replacement of the pronoun in 4.0014<sup>5</sup>, the biggest change is to the content of 4.00141,

<sup>4</sup> Sluga has argued that “We can be sure that Frege wrote ‘The Thought’ with Wittgenstein in mind” (Sluga 2002, p. 89). He points out that Frege's notion of “fact” as being a true thought, is effectively an attack on the notions of fact employed by Russell and Wittgenstein (p. 91).

<sup>5</sup> 4.0014: “~~Die Sp~~ Sie verkleidet den Gedanken” (Wittgenstein in Pilch 2016, A<sub>3</sub>, p. 36). Wittgenstein appears to have begun repeating simply ‘Language’, just as the sentence is in the *Tractatus*, before crossing it out and using a pronoun instead. This would appear to make more sense in the context, because 4.0014 is a

where Wittgenstein modified the end of the remark from referring to a different “viewpoint” or having “quite different things in view” (*Gesichtspunkten*), to referring to “entirely different purposes” (*Zwecken*) (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 22)<sup>6</sup>. Another remark, 4.0015, which follows on from 4.0014–4.00141 with “Thus...”, and so appears relevant as a further explanation, was included in MS104, but is not retained in the *Tractatus*.

- 4.0015 Thus the outward aspect of ordinary language makes every kind of illusion and confusion possible.
- 4.00151 *“Exist” figures as an intransitive verb like “go”; “you were” sounds like “you wear”; “identical” is an adjective; and “White” is a proper name* (Wittgenstein 1971, p. 83, my emphasis).

Its comment, 4.00151, provides examples of some ways in which ordinary language makes such illusion and confusion possible. Although 4.0015 was not retained, a portion of its comment, emphasised above in italics, was later combined with remarks 3.2014, 3.20141 (p. 54), and 3.201411 (p. 79) of MS104, and retained as remark 3.323 of the *Tractatus*, as interpolated below in brackets.

- 3.2014 Now in everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word can have different modes of signification — and so belong to different symbols; or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
- 3.20141 Thus the word “is” figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; the word “Green” figures as an adjective and as the proper name of a person [4.00151a]; “identical” is employed as an adjective, etc. etc. In the proposition “Green is green” (when “is” means the copula) the first word and the last do not merely have different meanings: they are *different symbols*.
- 3.201411 We speak of *something* but also of *something’s* happening (Wittgenstein 1971, pp. 67, 69, my interpolation in brackets).

comment on its parent, 4.001, whereas, in the *Tractatus*, 4.002 is a sibling of 4.001.

<sup>6</sup> 4.00141: “Und zwar so[,] daß man nach der äußeren Form des Kleides nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil diese ~~Form~~ äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Gesichtspunkten gebaut [anderen Zecken gebildet] ist[,] als nach dem [als danach], die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen” (Wittgenstein 1971, p. 82; Pilch 2016, A<sub>3</sub>, p. 36). The square brackets are the editors’ indication of additions and replacements in the *Tractatus*.

In remark 3.323 of the *Tractatus*, the example of the word “Green” is combined with the example of the proposition “Green is green” and placed after the content of 3.201411. Remark 3.201412, part of which becomes the fifth and final paragraph of 4.002, is added much later in MS104 (at p. 95) as a further comment upon the group above. Only the first sentence of that remark is retained in the *Tractatus*.

3.201412 *The tacit conventions on which the understanding of our language depends are enormously complicated.* With every proposition much is supplied in thought which is not put into words.

If “*A*” is used to mean a person, the proposition, “*A* is sitting”, is admissible, but not if “*A*” signifies this book. – But once a proposition is completely analyzed, everything that depends upon the understanding of its form must be unaffected by the meanings of its parts (Wittgenstein 1971, p. 69, my emphasis on the first sentence).

Here, Wittgenstein provides an example of such conventions. The meaning of a name such as “*A*” in a language determines the admissibility of propositions predicating certain properties of *A*. People sit but books do not. Then we are told that in the final analysis, the meanings of the parts of completely analysed propositions do not affect the understanding of their form (or their admissibility). This is perhaps because simple objects cannot be heterogenous in the way in which people and books are, although they may nevertheless have differing possibilities of combination in states of affairs.

It is apparent that there is somewhat of an interchange between the two groups of remarks, leading eventually to the production of both remark 3.323 and remark 4.002 of the *Tractatus*. The first sentence of remark 3.201412 is taken under remark 4.002 as its fifth and final paragraph. Thereby, that remark, which was a comment on the superficially similar examples from everyday language (cf. 3.2014–3.201411), becomes in the *Tractatus* a comment on language disguising thought (4.002(5)), and ultimately on thought in its relation to language (cf. 4–4.001). 4.0015 was discarded in this process, perhaps in part due to its similarity with 3.20142, which was retained as 3.324 in the *Tractatus*, and which also mentions “confusion” (*Verwechslung*).

3.20142 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of

philosophy is full of them) (Wittgenstein 1971, p. 69).

So, on that side of the interchange, Wittgenstein opted for a series of examples from everyday language (3.323), followed by a statement of their confusing effects of which philosophy is full (3.324), rather than retaining the statement that language's disguise makes illusion and confusion possible (4.0015), followed by examples from everyday language (4.00151). The remainder of the run of remarks concludes with 4.0016–4.00163, which are retained, together with an additional sentence, in 4.003–4.0031 of the *Tractatus*. There too the failure to understand the logic of our language is identified as what leads to the employment of nonsensical pseudo-propositions in philosophy.

## § 2. Tracing 4.002 to its sources

In this section, I trace the sources and influences upon remark 4.002 further back in Wittgenstein's process of composing the *Tractatus*. Much of this work has already been undertaken by others, which I rely upon and discuss here. However, I believe that some sources that I will adduce have either not been recognised previously, or have not been adopted by some scholars. In the present section, I discuss some of these potential sources and, in the next section, I will deal with the more difficult matter of tracing the set of influences that led to the use of the extended clothing metaphor in remark 4.002(4b) for which there is no apparent original source text.

There has been much disagreement over the issue of when MS104 was written, or compiled. For example, McGuinness has suggested that the first 70 pages were produced between October 1915 and March 1916 (McGuinness 2002, p. 266). Bazzocchi has argued more recently that Wittgenstein probably began MS104 in May 1915, on the basis of a notebook entry on the 18<sup>th</sup> of June of that year that appears to report the content of a correction that is made on page 12 (Bazzocchi, 2015, p. 338). I see no reason against Bazzocchi's contention, which I find plausible, but I will not address the issue further here as my claims regarding the origins of the clothing metaphor do not rely upon it.

Most of the remarks of MS104 of present interest to us, which are eventually incorporated as paragraphs of 4.002 of the *Tractatus*, that is, remarks 4.0011 (p. 30), 4.0012–4.00141 (p. 36), and 3.201412 (p. 95), discussed in the previous section, can be traced back to antecedents in earlier (or contemporaneous)

sources. However, paragraph three (4.0013) and part of paragraph four, containing the extended clothing metaphor (4.00141), have not to my knowledge been traced. The extended clothing metaphor in particular has received only cursory treatment, as there is a lack of a clear source text in this case. Nevertheless, we will discuss the potential influences upon Wittgenstein's composition of it in the next section.

It is often the case that these sources were incorporated chronologically from earlier notes and manuscripts as comments that progressively construct the tree structure of the manuscript. I am inclined to follow Kang's contention regarding MS104 that "given that the remarks on pp. 28–34 come from *NL [Notes]*, and a significant portion of pp. 40–52 from *NB [Notebooks] 1–2*, it is natural to suppose that those on pp. 34–40 are mainly from a manuscript Wittgenstein composed between *NL* and *NB 1–2*". Kang refers in particular to a manuscript covering Wittgenstein's time in Norway, between October 1913 and June 1914 (Kang 2005, pp. 5–6). However, as we shall see, I am inclined to allow this period to extend beyond the time in Norway and June 1914 to Wittgenstein's return to and time in Austria before the war.

For now, we will begin with the first paragraph of 4.002, which has its antecedents in remark 4.0011 of MS104, and in paragraph B15 of the *Notes*, Wittgenstein's first surviving manuscript.

At a pinch, one is tempted to interpret "not-*p*" as "everything else, only not *p*". That from a single fact *p* an infinity of others, not-not-*p* etc., follow, is hardly credible. *Man possesses an innate capacity for constructing symbols with which some sense can be expressed, without having the slightest idea what each word signifies.* The best example of this is mathematics, for man has until lately used the symbols for numbers without knowing what they signify or that they signify nothing (Wittgenstein [1913], in Potter 2008, p. 278, B15, my emphasis on third sentence except for "some" in original).

"The Birmingham *Notes*" comprise the "B" paragraphs, which were dictated to a stenographer by Wittgenstein in German from his notebooks on the 7th of October 1913, while he was visiting Pinsent in Birmingham. A copy of the resulting typescript was translated by Russell some time after that, while Wittgenstein was in Norway. Potter suggests that this was done in February 1914, on the basis of Russell's mention of his translating Wittgenstein's work in a letter to Ottoline Morrell at the end of February (Potter 2008, p. 265). It is the third sentence of B15, emphasised above, that is retained, modified, and



extended in MS104 (p. 30)<sup>7</sup>. The most notable change being that from its referring to individual symbols to referring to whole languages and, correlatively, the change from their ability to express “*some* sense” to a language’s ability to express “every sense”. The example of the numerical symbols in mathematics is also replaced with that of sound production in speech (cf. 4.0011, quoted earlier).

The second paragraph of 4.002 has antecedents in remark 4.0012 of MS104, and 14.5.15 of the *Notebooks*: “Language is a part of our organism and no less complicated than it” (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 48e)<sup>8</sup>. This case is rather straightforward, as the only changes made to it in MS104 and the *Tractatus*, are that “everyday language” and the “human organism” are used, rather than simply “language” and “our organism”. The third paragraph, however, is less straightforward. It has antecedents in remark 4.0013 of MS104. To my knowledge, a source has not previously been adduced for this paragraph<sup>9</sup>. I suggest that the first paragraph of the entry from 11.10.14 of the *Notebooks* is a potential source.

Our difficulty now lies in the fact that to all appearances analysability, or its opposite, is not reflected in language. That is to say: We can *not*, as it seems, gather from language alone whether for example there are real subject–predicate facts or not. But how COULD we *express* this fact or its opposite? *This must be shewn* (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 10e).

The topic of the passage is quite similar to that of 4.0013, in that it is about human incapacity to gather from everyday language alone, or “immediately”, the logic of language, or its analysability, for example, into subject and predicate, etc. There is a similar shift here to that noted above regarding paragraph two, whereby the remark was depersonalised by referring to “human” instead of “our”. In the present paragraph, the personal “We can *not* [...] gather” shifts to a claim about its being “not humanly possible to gather”. This passage from 11.10.14 contains the only use of the verb to “gather” (*entnehmen*) in these *Notebooks*, which is also the verb used in 4.0013 in MS104. There are only two other uses of the verb in MS104 at 5.0413 (p. 17) and 5.154 (p. 107), whose contents do not appear to be relevantly similar to the

<sup>7</sup> This comparison with 4.002 is noted by the editors, von Wright and Anscombe (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 95).

<sup>8</sup> The editors note to compare with 4.002.

<sup>9</sup> Pilch (2016, A<sub>3</sub>, p. 36) does not note sources for 4.0013–4.0015.

passage in any other way. So, it is at least plausible that it is an early source for remark 4.0013, if any.

The fourth paragraph of 4.002 is that which is of the most interest to us in this article and presents the most difficulty, so we leave it aside in order to return to it presently and further in the next section. The fifth paragraph has an antecedent in remark 3.201412 of MS104, for which the source is the second paragraph of 22.6.15 of the *Notebooks*.

The conventions of our language are extraordinarily complicated. There is enormously much added in thought to each proposition and not said. (These conventions are exactly like Whitehead's "Conventions". They are definitions with *a certain generality of form*.) (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 70e)<sup>10</sup>.

In 3.201412, it is made explicit that these conventions are both "tacit" and that "the understanding of our language depends" upon them. The latter explication is dropped for the *Tractatus*, and only the first sentence is retained. The reference to Whitehead's "Conventions" is not retained by either version. Another interesting remark at 22.6.15 follows the one quoted above: "I only want to justify the vagueness of ordinary sentences, for it *can* be justified" (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 70e). That is, ordinary language, vague as it is, is also in logical order just as it is.

So, of the four paragraphs discussed so far, sources have previously been suggested for the first, second and fifth, and I have suggested an overlooked potential source for the third, in the first paragraph of 11.10.14 of the *Notebooks*. However, our main focus is upon the origin of the clothing metaphor in the fourth paragraph of 4.002, which, as we have seen has antecedents in remarks 4.0014 and 4.00141 of MS104. I will follow others in suggesting that paragraph B69 of the Birmingham *Notes* is the source for remark 4.0014, where a very similar contention to that of "language disguises thought" can be found.

The structure of the proposition must be recognized, the rest comes of itself. But ordinary language conceals the structure of the proposition: in it, relations look like predicates, predicates like names, etc. (Wittgenstein [1913], in Potter 2008, p. 283, B69)<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> The editors note to compare with 4.002.

<sup>11</sup> The uncorrected version begins "The construction of the sentence [...]" (Potter 2008, p. 291). Potter

Indeed, B69, or its Costello version, has long been associated with *Tractatus* 4.002(4a) and so 4.0014 in MS104<sup>12</sup>. However, Pilch (2016, A<sub>3</sub>, p. 54) associates B69 instead with remark 3.2014 in MS104. I think that this is a quite a stretch as it is not clear that it bears any resemblance to that remark. Furthermore, to my mind, a much better alternative for a kernel of remark 3.2014 is instead the final sentence of B1: “A name can not only occur in two different propositions, but can occur in the same way in both” (Wittgenstein [1913], in Potter 2008, p. 276, B1)<sup>13</sup>. Pilch notes the use of only the second sentence of B1 elsewhere in MS104 (2016, A<sub>3</sub>, pp. 32 & 38). This, at least, is a remark of a similar form. That is, it mentions words having multiple modes of signification employed in (superficially) the same way (cf. 3.2014, quoted earlier), as opposed to the general statement about language concealing structure followed by brief examples that we find in B69.

In the English translation of B69 that we have available to us, reference to clothing is wholly absent, and the focus, at least verbally, is on propositions rather than thoughts, but the intention appears to have been quite similar. Indeed, in this regard, it is important to take into account that we are relying here upon Russell’s translation of the typescript. As is evident from his own writings, Russell has a preference for the word “conceal” in this context, and he reserves “disguise”, which he uses much less frequently, for other contexts often involving disguising of emotions or intent<sup>14</sup>. The German verb that he

incorrectly notes that paragraph B69 was a duplicate omitted from the Costello version. He also fails to include it when analysing the differences with the Costello version, which has the following instead: “[...] recognized and then the rest is easy. [...] in it relations look like predicates, and predicates [...]” (Costello 1957, pp. 234–5; cf. Potter 2008, pp. 292 ff.).

<sup>12</sup> For example, see Black (1964, pp. 133 & 138) and, more recently, Potter (2008, p. 68). No note of it is made by von Wright and Anscombe (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 96).

<sup>13</sup> The Costello version has ‘cannot’ for ‘can not’ (Costello 1957, p. 236), which is surely an error (cf. Potter 2008, p. 273).

<sup>14</sup> The following are some examples of Russell’s use of ‘conceal’ in similar contexts: “Leibniz appears to me to be right in holding that the verb conceals the inmost essence of the proposition, and even of truth itself; but the necessity for particles in his language ought to have shown him the falsity of the subject-predicate logic” (Russell 1903, p. 180). “It would always be obvious at a glance whether a collection possessed this property or not, if it were not for the concealed ambiguity in common logical terms such as *true* and *false*, which gives an appearance of being a single function to what is really a conglomeration [...]” (Russell 1908, p. 236). “We mean that there was a noise of a certain class, the class called ‘A’. Thus when we say ‘A

translated as “conceals” could nevertheless have been *verkleiden*, which includes the root *Kleid* (“dress” or “clothes”) (cf. Ribeiro 2013, p. 384), whereas “conceals” has an adjacent but non-cognate etymology involving being hidden or covered. Without the availability of something like the accompanying extended metaphor contained in the later remark 4.00141 of MS104, there would not have been any particular motivation for Russell to have translated the word as “disguises” or “dresses”, rather than the more bare “conceals”. Especially in view of the fact that it went against his own practice.

Potter argues that Wittgenstein either had or “[...] obtained in Norway a copy of the Birmingham typescript, from which he later extracted remarks to include in the *Prototractatus*” (Potter 2008, p. 271). Wittgenstein ceased adding remarks from the *Notes* to MS104 consecutively at page 34. However, he continues to add remarks from the *Notes* intermittently as he continues, for example, there are two more instances on the very next page of the manuscript (p. 37). If this is correct, and Wittgenstein was working from the original German, it would be all the more reasonable to suggest that B69 is an antecedent of remark 4.0014 in MS104, and so of the first sentence of the fourth paragraph included in 4.002 of the *Tractatus*.

However, even the presence of *verkleiden* in the original of B69 need not lead us to conclude that any explicit clothing metaphor was intended at that time. Such inherent metaphorical characteristics are present in many words of ordinary language as a matter of course without the inherent metaphor being operative or actively relied upon. Wittgenstein could simply have meant to use the word just as baldly as Russell uses “conceals” in his translation. That 4.0014 and 4.00141 are separate remarks in MS104, and that the source of remark 4.00141 does not appear in the *Notes*, provide at least *prima facie* support for the supposition that they were selected from separate source texts, as is the case for many other examples of comments upon remarks. MS104 is effectively a catalogue of such examples, as Wittgenstein usually selected most of what he could from a source text before moving on, perhaps even out of necessity during the war (Bazzocchi 2015, p. 351), which often led to comments being added from sources distinct from those for the respective remarks of which they were comments. So, assuming B69 as the source of remark 4.0014, and no further source for remark 4.00141 in the *Notes* or *Notebooks*, and nothing evident from

preceded B’ our statement has a concealed logical form, which is the same as that of the statement: ‘first there was the bark of a dog, and then the neigh of a horse’” (Russell 1940, p. 31, cf. pp. 99, 110).

Moore's notes from Norway, the source of remark 4.00141 remains in question.

### § 3. The Extended Clothing Metaphor of 4.002(4b)

In this section, I will trace the influences upon Wittgenstein's use of the clothing metaphor. This is a difficult task because the more that one looks for them, clothing metaphors like the one in question appear to be ubiquitous. Such metaphors are certainly not original with Wittgenstein and he may have been influenced by one or more of its uses by a number of other authors. So, any judgement we make will of course be on the basis of a balance of probability and involve consideration not merely of textual evidence, and careful attention to how the metaphor is used in each case, but also circumstantial evidence and consideration of availability of the text.

Such metaphors occur in poetry quite often. For example, Alexander Pope includes, as part of an extended metaphor in his *An Essay on Criticism* (1711), the phrase: "Expression is the dress of thought" (Pope 2006, p. 27). Another early usage is found in Samuel Johnson's *The Lives of the Poets* (1779), when discussing Cowley.

Language is the dress of thought [...] Truth indeed is always truth, and reason is always reason; they have an intrinsic and unalterable value, and constitute that intellectual gold which defies destruction: but gold may be so concealed in baser matter, that only a chymist can recover it; sense may be so hidden in unrefined and plebeian words, that none but philosophers can distinguish it; and both may be so buried in impurities, as not to pay the cost of their extraction (Johnson 2009, p. 48).

There are many other such examples, and I am sure that there are even more to be found in German literature. I quote these examples merely to show the difficulties involved in tracking influence in relation to this metaphor. The general strategy, which I think reasonable, has been to rely upon already known lines of influence between Wittgenstein and other authors. This has the effect of narrowing down the number of potential items for consideration. In the first of the following two subsections, I will discuss the clothing metaphors that are to be found in the work of Hertz, Boltzmann, and Frege. In the second of the subsections, I will discuss the clothing metaphors that are to be found in the work of Karl Kraus.

### § 3.1 Clothing metaphors in the work of Hertz, Boltzmann, and Frege

Some scholars have suggested that a possible influence upon Wittgenstein's use of the clothing metaphor may have been Heinrich Hertz<sup>15</sup>, who used a similar metaphor albeit for a different purpose. In the closing remarks of Hertz' introduction to a collection of papers called *Electric Waves (Untersuchungen ueber die Ausbreitung der elektrischen Kraft, 1892)* he says:

[...] scientific accuracy requires of us that we should in no wise confuse the simple and homely figure, as it is presented to us by nature, with the gay garment which we use to clothe it. Of our own free will we can make no change whatever in the form of the one, but the cut and colour of the other we can choose as we please (Hertz [1892] 1893, p. 28)<sup>16</sup>.

In this regard, it has been overlooked that Boltzmann also happened to provide his own English paraphrase and response to this passage from Hertz, in a letter to the editor of *Nature* that was published in February 1895.

Certainly, [...] Hertz is right when he says: "The rigour of science requires, that we distinguish well the undraped figure of nature itself from the gay-coloured vesture with which we clothe it at our pleasure." But I think the predilection for nudity would be carried too far if we were to forego every hypothesis. Only we must not demand too much from hypotheses (Boltzmann 1895, p. 413).

The prominence of these quotations and, indeed, their potential influence upon Wittgenstein, in view of his general appreciation for the work of Hertz and Boltzmann, make it at least plausible that, if Wittgenstein came across these sources, he might have been influenced by them. It is difficult definitively to rule out such an influence. However, it should be taken into account that the context of Hertz' use of the clothing metaphor is quite different to its uses by both Wittgenstein and Frege. In particular, there is no mention of language or

<sup>15</sup> This has been noted by Hacker (1972, p. 12), also in an earlier paper of mine (Begley 2021, p. 326, n. 10), and again more recently by Klagge (2022, p. 105).

<sup>16</sup> "Aber die Strenge der Wissenschaft erfordert doch, dass wir dies bunte Gewand, welches wir der Theorie überwerfen, und dessen Schnitt und Farbe vollständig in unserer Gewalt liegt, wohl unterscheiden von der einfachen und schlichten Gestalt selbst, welche die Natur uns entgegenführt und an deren Formen wir aus unserer Willkür nichts zu ändern vermögen." (Hertz 1892, p. 31).

thought *per se*, and no attempt by Hertz to generalise the picture (in the final paragraph of an introductory essay). Further, there would appear to be little to say about when Wittgenstein would have come across these texts and how that is to fit into the narrative of how MS104 and its sources were produced. With this in mind, we should also consider other potential influences, especially if they are closer with regard to their content, and offer a more certain connection between Wittgenstein and the source in question.

Fundamentally, the closeness of the passages quoted from Wittgenstein and Frege at the beginning of our investigation stand in need of explanation. Frege and Wittgenstein met a number of times and also engaged in correspondence but, from what remains of this, the clothing metaphor is not apparent. However, the metaphor was indeed used much earlier by Frege and so may have been mentioned in conversation with Wittgenstein during the intervening period. The following rather clear and pertinent examples of Frege's use of the metaphor come from a posthumously published manuscript, entitled "Logic", dated to 1897:

The word "I" simply designates a different person in the mouths of different people. It is not necessary that the person who feels cold should himself give utterance to the thought that he feels cold. Another person can do this by using a name to designate the one who feels cold.

In this way a thought can be clothed in a sentence that is more in keeping with its being independent of the person thinking it. The possibility of doing this distinguishes it from a mental state expressed by an interjection (Frege 1979, p. 135; also printed in Frege 1997, p. 235).

This passage illustrates Frege's anti-psychologistic views regarding thought, which are motivated by the example of the use of the word "I" and its replacement having the same reference. Later in the manuscript, Frege again distinguishes between thoughts and ideas or feelings, and notes a "difficulty".

Logic has the task of isolating what is logical, not, to be sure, so that we should think without having images, which is no doubt impossible, but so that we should consciously distinguish the logical from what is attached to it in the way of ideas and feelings. There is a difficulty here in that we think in some language or other and that grammar, which has a significance for language analogous to that which logic has for judgement, is a mixture of the logical and the psychological. If this were not so, all languages would necessarily have the same grammar. It is true that we can express the same thought in

different languages; but the psychological trappings, the clothing of the thought, will often be different (Frege 1979, p. 142; also printed in Frege 1997, p. 243).

It is clear from these quotations that for a long time Frege had used the clothing metaphor both for the relation between sentences and thought, and in particular when distinguishing thought from its mental and psychological trappings. Beaney points out that “There is a certain degree of overlap between the first two sections of ‘Logic’ and Frege’s later essay on ‘Thought’ [...]: they can thus be regarded as an early draft” (Beaney in Frege 1997, p. 227, n. 3). So, this material is an antecedent to the material that we first quoted earlier from his 1918 article. It was originally part of Frege’s ongoing attempts to write a textbook on logic. The only eventual issue from this project was the series of three articles published towards the end his life, beginning with “Der Gedanke” (1918) (Beaney in Frege 1997, p. 227).

Frege also used a clothing metaphor when discussing negation. The following is from another posthumously published manuscript, “Introduction to Logic” (1906):

To argue whether negation belongs to the whole thought or to the predicative part is every bit as unfruitful as to argue whether a coat clothes a man who is already clothed or whether it belongs together with the rest of his clothing. Since a coat covers a man who is already clothed, it automatically becomes part and parcel with the rest of his apparel. We may, metaphorically speaking, regard the predicative component of a thought as a covering for the subject–component. If further coverings are added, these automatically become one with those already there (Frege 1979, p. 185).

Frege later expresses the final development of this view in the sequel to his 1918 article, and second of his final trio of articles, “Negation” (1919).

I compare that which needs completion to a wrapping, e.g. a coat, which cannot stand upright by itself; in order to do that, it must be wrapped round somebody. The man whom it is wrapped round may put on another wrapping, e.g. a cloak. The two wrappings unite to form a single wrapping. There are thus two possible ways of looking at the matter; we may say either that a man who already wore a coat was now dressed up in a second wrapping, a cloak, or, that his clothing consists of two wrappings — coat and cloak. These ways of looking at it have absolutely equal justification (Frege 1997, p. 361).



It is probable, given the long period of development of Frege's "textbook" project, over more than twenty years, that Frege mentioned and discussed it with others. It is also quite improbable that Frege would have avoided discussing a relation so fundamental as that between sentence and thought, or a topic such as negation. So, if Wittgenstein was party or privy to such a discussion he could have simply picked up the use of the clothing metaphor for this purpose in conversation. However, this is something that we can but speculate about.

Nevertheless, there are works of Frege's that contain something like the metaphor, which Wittgenstein probably did read. Frege had used a clothing metaphor (or something resembling one) regarding concepts, in *The Foundations of Arithmetic (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884)*:

What is called the history of concepts is really a history either of our knowledge of concepts or of the meanings of words. Often it is only through enormous intellectual work, which can last for hundreds of years, that knowledge of a concept in its purity is achieved, by peeling off the alien clothing that conceals it from the mind's eye (Frege 1997, p. 88).

It is perhaps safe to assume that Wittgenstein read this, because he is known to have had a copy of the *Grundlagen* at Cambridge, which he abandoned there when he returned to Norway in October 1913. This copy was bought by Russell and is now preserved in the Russell Archives, however, it contains no annotations, so it provides no further clues in this regard (Kienzler 2011, pp. 81–82). The intent seems reasonably similar to that of some of the other texts that I have provided. However, the word for "clothing" is not strictly present here and so "wrapping" or "accretions" is probably a better translation<sup>17</sup>. This is perhaps enough to cast doubt on it as being an influence for a clothing metaphor *per se*.

A clearer potential source of influence in a work by Frege is to be found in a footnote of his paper "On Concept and Object" (1892).

It is possible for one sentence to give no more and no less information than another; and, for all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts. If all transformation of the expression were forbidden on the plea that this would alter the

<sup>17</sup> "[...] ihn aus den fremden Umhüllungen herauszuschälen, die ihn dem geistigen Auge verbargen" (Frege 1884, p. VII). Austin's translation gives: "[...] stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it" (Frege 1960, p. xix).

content as well, logic would simply be crippled; for the task of logic can hardly be performed without trying to recognize the thought in its manifold guises. Moreover, all definitions would then have to be rejected as false (Frege 1997, pp. 184–5, n. G)<sup>18</sup>.

Here we do not have an extended clothing metaphor, however, we do have the word “guises” (*Einkleidungen*), from the root *Kleid*. This brings to mind again the character of remark 4.0014 of MS104, and its earlier source in B69 of the *Notes*. In B69, it is “the structure of the proposition” that “must be recognized”, but ordinary language “conceals” it in manifold ways. Similarly, in the quote from Frege, the metaphor is only present in that it comes with the inherent root of the word *Einkleidungen* (“guises”), and so is not relied upon. It is reasonable to suppose that Wittgenstein may have been influenced by this when he wrote B69, perhaps, as we suggested before, even in his use of the verb *verkleiden* (“disguises”).

However, this does not suffice as a full story of influence regarding the extended metaphor, which occurs only in texts of Frege’s to which it appears Wittgenstein did not have access when he composed remark 4.00141 in MS104 or its antecedents, if any. Seizing solely on the speculation that an influence happened in conversation, and on the basis that Frege uses the metaphor in his manuscripts for over twenty years and so would have had it in mind, would be preferable only if there were no other potential textual influences of which we could be certain.

### § 3.2 Clothing metaphors in the work of Kraus

In his recent book on the context of the *Tractatus*, Klagge mentions the use of a clothing metaphor in a 1908 aphorism by the satirist Karl Kraus in his journal *Die Fackel*.

There are two sorts of writers. Those who are, and those who aren’t. With the first, content and form belong together, like soul and body; with the second, they merely match, like

<sup>18</sup> “Es ist möglich, daß ein Satz nicht mehr und nicht weniger Auskunft als ein anderer gibt; und trotz aller Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachen hat die Menschheit einen gemeinsamen Schatz von Gedanken. Wenn man jede Umformung des Ausdrucks verbieten wollte unter dem Vorgeben, daß damit auch der Inhalt verändert werde, so würde die Logik geradezu gelähmt; denn ihre Aufgabe ist nicht wohl lösbar, ohne daß man sich bemüht, den Gedanken in seinen mannigfachen Einkleidungen wiederzuerkennen. Auch jede Definition wäre als falsch zu verwerfen” (Frege 1892, p. 196, n. 1).

body and clothes (Kraus [1908], F259–60, p. 44, quoted in Klagge 2022, p. 106).

However, this does not appear to me to be very relevant, because again the context is different and the timing is before Wittgenstein was involved in considering the problems evident in 4.002. Even Klagge finds the relevance of the content uncertain, because “Kraus attributes the mismatch [i.e., mere matching] to poor writing rather than to the language itself” (2022, p. 106, my interpolation). The same passage from 1908 was earlier recognised in an article by Ribeiro (2013, p. 384), who is generally more concerned to show a connection between Kraus and Wittgenstein’s later work. He also quotes a further use of the metaphor from 1911:

The thoughtless man thinks that one only has a thought when one has it and dresses it up in words. He does not understand that in reality only he has a thought who has the word into which thought grows (Kraus [1911], F323, p. 18, quoted in Riberio 2013, p. 385)

This issue, from May 1911, is also prior to Wittgenstein’s meeting Frege and his arrival at Cambridge in October of 1911. Wittgenstein would have been somewhat more acquainted with at least some of the work of Russell and Frege by this stage. However, the *Notes* are usually taken to stem from a short period before September 1913, and it does not make much sense to consider influences before that if they are not already clearly discernible in the *Notes*.

There are, indeed, not merely two but *many* other instances of the metaphor to be found in *Die Fackel*<sup>19</sup>. To my mind, there is one example from *Die Fackel* that is particularly salient due especially to its context, the time of its publication, and the circumstances at that time. To my knowledge, it has not been remarked upon in this connection before. Engelmann reported that Wittgenstein told him that when he went to live in Norway in 1913 “he had Karl Kraus’s *Die Fackel* sent to his address”. Engelmann adds that he is “convinced that the way of thinking which he [Wittgenstein] found in Kraus’s writings exercised a decisive and lasting influence on the objectives of his philosophical activity” (Engelmann 1967, p. 123). If we examine the contents of *Die Fackel* around this time, there does not appear to be any pertinent use of the clothing

<sup>19</sup> See, for example (Kraus 2019): 1910, F303–4, p. 42; F307–8, p. 32; 1911, F329–30, p. 9; 1912, F343–4, p. 14; 1915, F413–7, p. 44; 1926, F735–42, p. 64. The entire catalogue of *Die Fackel* was made open access in 2019 by Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. It is available online at <https://fackel.oeaw.ac.at>

metaphor until the 10<sup>th</sup> of July 1914, Issue 400–3. In one of his *Notizen*, Kraus mentions recent praise given to the author Otto Ernst Schmidt.

“*Der Turmhahn*”, the organ in which the Staack–men’s vitality is periodically activated, finds the highest tones for the well–known Nietzsche opponent Otto Ernst, the man who is one of our best sandpipers and mainly has the merit of having restrained the immigration to Sylt for all time. This Herr Otto Ernst, whose Nietzsche writings I don’t know as well as his calves, is praised for the following sentence in particular: Nietzsche became the father of a kind of stylistic artist, “for whom language is not the body of thought, but rather a dress in which thought flaunts itself”. And this thought, together with the associated dress and body, was borrowed from me by Herr Otto Ernst, who evidently knows me better than I know him (Kraus [1914] 2019, F400–3, p. 43, my translation)<sup>20</sup>.

Kraus begins this satirical note by reporting praise of Otto Ernst in *Der Turmhahn*, a journal published by the Staackmann press that Kraus was wont to criticise<sup>21</sup>. Ernst was among others who were often subjected to Kraus’ satire in similar ways over many years. In this passage, Kraus is pointing out that an organ of the Staackmann press had effectively praised *him*, in view of the claim that Ernst had “borrowed” his thought, etc. The quotation came from a short book that had been recently published by Otto Ernst entitled *Nietzsche der falsche prophet* (“Nietzsche the false prophet”). The immediately prior context of the quotation is “Language is often more important to him; he revels in her;

<sup>20</sup> “Der Turmhahn, das Organ, in welchem die Staackmänner ihre Lebfrische periodisch betätigen, findet die höchsten Töne für den bekannten Nietzsche-Gegner Otto Ernst, den Mann, der einer unserer besten Strandläufer ist und hauptsächlich das Verdienst hat, den Zuzug nach Sylt für alle Zeiten ferngehalten zu haben. Diesem Herrn Otto Ernst, dessen Nietzsche-Schrift ich nicht so gut kenne wie seine Wadeln, wird besonders der Satz nach-gerühmt: Nietzsche sei der Vater einer Art von Stil-Artisten geworden, »denen die Sprache nicht Körper der Gedanken, sondern ein Kleid ist, mit dem der Gedanke prunkt«. Und diesen Gedanken, samt dem dazugehörigen Kleid und Körper hat Herr Otto Ernst, der mich offenbar besser kennt als ich ihn, von mir ausgeliehen” (Kraus [1914] 2019, F400–3, p. 43).

<sup>21</sup> The reference to Otto Ernst’s calves, etc., recalls a photo of the author at a beach on the island of Sylt, which had been reproduced in an earlier issue of *Die Fackel* from the 21<sup>st</sup> of April and captioned “Otto Ernst als Strandläufer von Sylt” (‘...as a sandpiper from Sylt’) (Kraus [1914] 2019, F398, p. 28). Only a minute before beginning a public reading on the 27<sup>th</sup> of May, Kraus was issued with a court order that had been granted to the original publisher of the image, Staackmann, which had initiated legal proceedings against him. Kraus read out the order, disallowing him from showing a projection of the photograph, to the audience (Kraus 1974, pp. 43–44).

he plays with her happily; it is an end in itself for him. Here, too, he became the father of a kind of stylistic artist [...]” (Ernst 1914, p. 131). Later in the same note, Kraus quotes from a letter of praise for Ernst’s philosophical acumen, also published in *Der Turmhahn*, in which the letter writer, a “Goethe scholar”, obliquely compares Ernst to Schopenhauer by suggesting that an encyclopaedia should be made based on his work.

By the time that the issue of *Die Fackel* was published, Wittgenstein would have recently travelled from Norway to Austria, first to Vienna, where he wrote to Moore on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, and then to his family’s summer estate, the Hochreit (McGuinness 2008, p. 75). This is also the issue that carried an obituary for Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria who had been assassinated on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June. The journal was not published again until December. It appears that Wittgenstein was reading the journal avidly around that time, and he certainly would have had the opportunity to continue receiving issues of the journal while in Vienna, or to arrange to have them sent to the Hochreit. So, I believe, especially in light of the prominence of this issue in particular, that it is likely that Wittgenstein read the issue. It may even have been what finally induced Wittgenstein to contact Ludwig von Ficker, the editor of *Der Brenner*, on the 14<sup>th</sup> of July (4 days after publication), in order to organise the donation of some of his inheritance to a number of authors and artists and to the journal itself (Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 83 ff.). The journal is mentioned and praised by Kraus a number of times in the issue (cf. pp. 44, 50, 57), the first occurrence of which is in the very same note shortly after the passage containing the clothing metaphor quoted earlier. *Der Brenner* is also mentioned in earlier issues from January and March of 1914 (Kraus 2019). Regarding whether Wittgenstein had it in mind since then, or it was the July issue that crystalised his decision, it is difficult to say.

In any event, the philosophical context of the use of the clothing metaphor in this case, namely, the quoted reference to Nietzsche, and the later reference to Schopenhauer in the same note, Ernst’s philosophical acumen aside, probably also got Wittgenstein’s attention. It may have even kindled within him a greater interest in Nietzsche<sup>22</sup>. Perhaps it also put him in mind of earlier uses

<sup>22</sup> Later that year, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 1914, while in Kraków, Wittgenstein noted in his private diary that he bought a copy of Volume 8 of Nietzsche’s *Works*. His remark on this begins: “Am very troubled by his animosity towards Christianity. For his writings also contain an element of truth” (As quoted in Westergaard 2007, p. 243).

of the metaphor by Kraus, in view of the fact that Kraus is so explicit about it being *his* thought that had been “borrowed”. Most of all, it would have put him in mind of his own statement at B69 of the *Notes*, which as we saw earlier could have already contained the kernel of the metaphor, perhaps gleaned from Frege’s words. This, I propose, is what likely prompted him to extend the metaphor that was merely latent in that remark. That is, in all the other textual sources that we have considered something was lacking in some respect, either the expression was not similar, or the use of the metaphor regarded a different topic, or the circumstances of the influence could not be determined. Only the instance in the July 1914 issue of *Die Fackel* appears to have the correct kind of expression, a philosophical context, and of which it is known both to have been available to Wittgenstein and likely that he read it given its prominence.

#### § 4. Concluding thoughts and words

In this article, I have shown that it is possible to gain a near-complete picture of the antecedents and original sources for remark 4.002 of the *Tractatus*. We have seen that an early version of the remark consisted of separate remarks in MS104, some of which occur as comments under different propositions than they do in the *Tractatus*, and which were involved in an interchange of content to arrive at the final version. This, together with some remarks that were removed in the final version, provides us with additional context and connections with remarks 3.323 and others.

We subsequently saw that it was possible to trace much of the content of 4.002 further back in Wittgenstein’s process to passages in the *Notes* and *Notebooks*. In particular, I adduced the first paragraph of 11.10.14 of the *Notebooks* as being a potential source for the third paragraph of 4.002. I also argued in favour of B69 of the *Notes* as being the source of 4.002(4a), the first line of the fourth paragraph, and against its being the source for remark 3.2014 of MS104, as claimed by Pilch. Regarding the latter remark, I argued that the final sentence of B1 is a better candidate for being an antecedent kernel. We saw later that the expression of B69 is quite similar to that in a footnote in Frege’s “On Concept and Object”, which Wittgenstein may have had in mind at the time. In both cases, an explicit or extended clothing metaphor is not present. So, we had to look elsewhere for it.

We saw that such metaphors are ubiquitous and occur in many writers in various forms. Hence, it was all the more important to take other factors into

account to determine any potential influences. We first considered clothing metaphors in Hertz, which had been suggested in previous literature on the matter, and provided a further text in which Boltzmann comments on Hertz. However, it remains uncertain whether this influence occurred, and if it did, what its nature was in view of the fact that the context of the use was different. We then saw that there were in fact many examples to be found in the work of Frege, but all of the examples of the extended metaphor appear not to have been available to Wittgenstein except by word of mouth. So, we would have purely to rely on speculation in this case.

Finally, we saw that in the case of Karl Kraus' *Die Fackel* there are many instances of the clothing metaphor to be found, and some of these have previously been put forward in the literature. However, there is one instance that is particularly salient, and which is to be found in the July 1914 issue of the journal. The use of the metaphor there occurs in a philosophical context, in that both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are mentioned in the same note, and the metaphor itself is quoted from a book by Otto Ernst in which he criticises Nietzsche. We also know that Wittgenstein was avidly reading the journal around that time, and probably continued to after he returned to Austria from Norway. The issue in question was quite prominent, as it carried an obituary for Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and was last issue published before the war and until December of that year. So, in view of these circumstances, it is likely that Wittgenstein read the issue and, I propose, that this prompted him to compose the extended clothing metaphor.

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### **Language Disguises Thought: Uncovering the Origins of the Clothing Metaphor in *Tractatus* 4.002**

This article investigates the clothing metaphor in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* at remark 4.002. I consider the antecedents and origins of 4.002, in particular, of the fourth paragraph that contains the metaphor, and also suggest and argue for potential source texts for the third and fourth paragraphs. In particular, early sources for the *Tractatus*, such as the *Notes on Logic* and the *Notebooks 1914–1916*, letters, and other manuscripts and early drafts are considered, especially MS104 and the *Prototractatus* where the metaphor appears at remarks 4.0014 & 4.00141. The place of the metaphor among the context of the elucidations of these early manuscripts is discussed. I also consider similar uses of the metaphor that are present in the work of Hertz, Boltzmann, Frege, Kraus, and others. Some of these texts and potential influences are more compelling than those previously adduced or recognised in the literature. The appearances of the metaphor in the work of these authors and their potential influence upon Wittgenstein’s work is discussed.

**Keywords:** Wittgenstein · Clothing Metaphor · Disguise · Frege · Hertz · Boltzmann · Kraus.

### **El lenguaje disfraz a el pensamiento: descubriendo los orígenes de la metáfora de la vestimenta en el *Tractatus* 4.002**

Este artículo investiga la metáfora de la vestimenta en el *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* de Wittgenstein en 4.002. Tomo en cuenta los antecedentes y orígenes de 4.002, en particular, el cuarto párrafo que contiene la metáfora y también sugiero y argumento a favor de posibles textos fuentes para el tercero y cuarto párrafo. En particular, tomo en cuenta fuentes tempranos para el *Tractatus* como “Notes on Logic” y los *Diarios 1914–1916*, cartas, y otros manuscritos, en particular MS104 y el *Prototractatus* donde la metáfora aparece en las observaciones 4.0014 & 4.00141. Se discute el lugar de la metáfora en otros contextos de las elucidaciones de los manuscritos tempranos. También tomo en cuenta usos parecidos de la metáfora presentes en las obras de Hertz, Boltzmann, Frege, Kraus y otros. Algunos de estos textos y posibles

influencias son más convincentes que aquellos previamente invocados o reconocidos en la literatura. Se discuten las apariencias de la metáfora en la obra de estos autores y su posible influencia en la obra de Wittgenstein.

**Palabras claves:** Wittgenstein · Metáfora de la vestimenta · Disfraz · Frege · Hertz · Boltzmann · Kraus.

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